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Strategic Anticipation and Adjustment: Ex Ante and Ex Post Information in Explaining Sanctions Outcomes

Department of Political Science, 333 UCB, University of Colorado, Boulder, CO 80309-0333, USA, Steve.Chan{at}colorado.edu

The outcomes of economic sanctions should not be explained by ex ante information that has already been discounted by the interested parties when they decided to initiate or resist economic coercion. Therefore, contrary to much of the existing literature, only ex post information becoming available after the occurrence of sanctions should explain their results. This logic of strategic anticipation and selection applies to interstate interactions generally, such as those pertaining to the success of deterrence policy and the outbreak of war.

Key Words: Economic sanction • Strategic selection • Strategic anticipation • Ex ante and ex post information

International Political Science Review, Vol. 30, No. 3, 319-338 (2009)
DOI: 10.1177/0192512109105643


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