Advanced Search

Journal Navigation

Journal Home

Subscriptions

Archive

Contact Us

Table of Contents

Click here to sign up for SAGE Journal Email Alerts today!

Sign In to gain access to subscriptions and/or personal tools.
International Political Science Review
This Article
Right arrow Full Text (PDF)
Right arrow References
Right arrow Alert me when this article is cited
Right arrow Alert me if a correction is posted
Right arrow Citation Map
Services
Right arrow Email this article to a friend
Right arrow Similar articles in this journal
Right arrow Similar articles in Web of Science
Right arrow Alert me to new issues of the journal
Right arrow Add to Saved Citations
Right arrow Download to citation manager
Right arrowRequest Permissions
Right arrow Request Reprints
Right arrow Add to My Marked Citations
Citing Articles
Right arrow Citing Articles via Google Scholar
Right arrow Citing Articles via Scopus
Google Scholar
Right arrow Articles by Kotzian, P.
Right arrow Search for Related Content
Social Bookmarking
 Add to CiteULike   Add to Complore   Add to Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us   Add to Digg   Add to Reddit   Add to Technorati   Add to Twitter  
What's this?

Arguing and Bargaining in International Negotiations: On the Application of the Frame-Selection Model and its Implications

Peter Kotzian

Technical University of Darmstadt, Department of Political Science, D-64283 Darmstadt, Germany; peter.kotzian{at}pg.tu-darmstadt.de

The aim of this article is to make a conceptual contribution regarding the occurrence of arguing and bargaining in international negotiations and to loosening the unitary-actor assumption underlying state behavior. To explain the occurrence of arguing and bargaining, Esser (2001, 2004) used the frame-selection model developed for individual actors. Arguing and bargaining are seen as frames–fixed combinations of supreme aims, norms, behavioral routines, and symbols. Once activated, a frame largely determines an actor's behavior. Similar to the mechanism proposed by March and Olsen (1998), actors choose a frame given the symbolic information in the situation, but also given the utility associated with a frame. Formally modeling the choice of arguing and bargaining as frames, Esser (2004) treats states as unitary actors and derives several statements about the occurrence of each mode. The additional contribution of this article is the loosening of this assumption and the derivation of its implications. The frames adopted by states are conceptualized as those frames dominant among the individuals involved in any particular negotiation, be it by being members of delegations or national policy networks. There are fundamental differences between the frame of a person and the frame of a state. Further, each component of a state's frame results from a different aggregation process. Only for some frame components, like interests, an established aggregation process exists. This accounts for the differences in the occurrence and effectiveness of arguing and bargaining at the international level.

Key Words: Arguing • Bargaining • Frames • International negotiations

International Political Science Review, Vol. 28, No. 1, 79-99 (2007)
DOI: 10.1177/0192512107070404


Add to CiteULike CiteULike   Add to Complore Complore   Add to Connotea Connotea   Add to Del.icio.us Del.icio.us   Add to Digg Digg   Add to Reddit Reddit   Add to Technorati Technorati   Add to Twitter Twitter    What's this?