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International Political Science Review
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Conference

Debate: Goods, Games, and Institutions—Part 2

"Goods, Games, and Institutions": a Reply

Vinod K. Aggarwal

basc, 802 Barrows Hall #1970, University of California, Berkeley, ca 94720-1970, USA vinod{at}socrates.berkeley.edu

Cédric Dupont

Graduate Institute of International Studies, 11a Avenue de la Paix, 1202 Geneva, Switzerland dupont{at}hei.unige.ch

In "Goods, Games, and Institutions," we discussed the underlying conditions under which institutions might promote cooperation among states. Our unified theoretical framework specifies bargaining games based both on the costs and benefits of different types of goods and actors' capabilities. Klaus Wallner argues in his critique in this issue that our modeling approach is seriously flawed. We show that Wallner comes to his conclusion because of several simple analytical errors on his part. After pointing out the flaws in his reasoning, we show that our framework is robust and can be easily extended to explore key features of international relations.

Key Words: Bargaining games • International relations • Public goods provision

International Political Science Review, Vol. 23, No. 4, 402-410 (2002)
DOI: 10.1177/0192512102023004005
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Home page
 European Journal of International RelationsHome page
V. K. Aggarwal and C. Dupont
Comment on `Common Goods, Matrix Games and Institutional Response', by Katharina Holzinger in EJIR 9(2) pp. 173-212
European Journal of International Relations, September 1, 2003; 9(3): 475 - 478.
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