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The Nested Game of Democratization by Elections

flacso, Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales, Camino al Ajusco 377, Col. Héroes de Padierna, cp 14200 Mexico City, Mexico andreas{at}flacso.edu.mx

In developing an analytical framework for the comparative study of processes of democratization by elections, this article first lays out the techniques of electoral manipulation authoritarian rulers employ to control electoral outcomes. It argues next that manipulated elections tend to trigger two-level games in which electoral competition is "nested" inside electoral reform, and outlines the causal interaction and strategic interdependence of the two levels. It describes the basic strategic choices and strategic dilemmas actors face in iterative cycles of conflict. It analyzes the uncertainties of results, relations of power, and strategic responses that characterize the game. Finally, it explains how actors may cope with its ambivalent and uncertain nature—they may devise "mixed" strategies or privilege one level of the game over the other.

Key Words: Democratization • Elections • Electoral reform • Legitimacy • Nested games

International Political Science Review, Vol. 23, No. 1, 103-122 (2002)
DOI: 10.1177/0192512102023001006


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