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International Relations Theory and Game Theory: Baroque Modeling Choices and Empirical Robustness

University of Geneva, ECPR Research Board, Pierre.Allan{at}politic.unige.ch

Cédric Dupont

Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva, dupont{at}hei.unige.ch

The increasing popularity of game modeling in international relations theory has fostered a tendency toward theoretical elegance to the detriment of empirical concerns. In this article attention is focused on the empirical implications of a series of choices that users of game theory must make when they model social interactions. In particular, possible trade-offs between theoretical complexity and empirical robustness are evaluated. This is done both abstractly and with specific references to recent modeling efforts in the fields of security and international political economy.

International Political Science Review, Vol. 20, No. 1, 23-47 (1999)
DOI: 10.1177/0192512199201002


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